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Couples’ Relative Resources, Male Power, and 




Using two waves of the Generations and Gender Survey for eight European countries, we 
test under what conditions couples experience high levels of disagreement over time or 
separate. The results partly support the idea of relative resources, suggesting that a 
decrease in the status of men in couples (job loss) is significantly associated with high 
levels of conflict. The transition to high conflict is more frequent when there is a 
discrepancy between policy and behavior. Social policies designed to meet the needs of 
working parents in dual-earner couples together with the diffusion of gender egalitarian 
values can lead to a reduction in unhealthy levels of couple conflict.        
 






Conflict is inevitable in any meaningful relationship. It often involves one partner’s 
attempt to solve problems by persuading the other partner to look at things differently. 
This is considered a “constructive conflict,” in which couples work cooperatively to 
resolve disagreements (Theiss & Leustek, 2016). However, there are other types of 
conflicts that reveal maladjustment in relationships. Living together in this type of 
relationship can be a difficult everyday experience and can sometimes lead to domestic 
violence or separation (Gottman & Levenson, 1992). Some couples have “destructive 
conflicts,” often involving hostility (Theiss & Leustek, 2016), which can become 
particularly harmful to themselves and their children. Indeed, studies have shown that 
parents facing destructive conflicts tend to be less responsive to their children’s needs and 
to have poor emotional attachment (McCoy et al., 2013).  
This study focuses on heterosexual couples frequently involved in disagreements, 
representing one dimension of a destructive and unhealthy relationship. Our main research 
question is under what conditions couples experience high levels of disagreement or 
separate. We are interested in two specific conflict mechanisms. First, we explore whether 
changes in power relations in couples lead to increased conflict intensity. Second, we 
explore whether high levels of conflict are related to tensions resulting from the 
discrepancy between prevalent work-family arrangements, policy design, and gender 
values at the societal level. We analyze eight countries representing different models of 
work-family arrangements, family policy, and gender values: Bulgaria, Russia, Georgia, 
Germany, France, Austria, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic. 
This empirical analysis is based on wave 1 (2004-2007) and wave 2 (2007-2010) of the 
Generations and Gender Survey (GGS), which is a panel data set on families and life 
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course trajectories administered by the Generations and Gender Programme. The initial 
sample consists of 8,490 partnered men and 11,541 women aged 18 to 60 who are still 
with the same partner during the periods analyzed or who broke up with this partner. 
Conflict is estimated by a composite measure based on women’s and men’s responses to 
how often they disagree with their partner based on eight items (household chores, money, 
use of leisure time, sex, relationships with friends, relationships with parents and in-laws, 
having children, and drinking alcohol). This measure is then estimated dynamically using 
longitudinal data to observe the probability of a couple going from a “calm situation” (a 
low score on the sum of the eight items mentioned above) in wave 1 to a “hostile situation” 
(a high score on the disagree index) or a “relationship breakdown” in wave 2, controlling 
for relative resources, major family events, such as having children or health problems, 
and the societal context. To control for the risk of a couple entering a high conflict situation 
or separating in wave 2, we use multinomial logistic regression to estimate the likelihood 
of staying in a calm situation (no conflict or low conflict), shifting to a destructive 
relationship (high conflict), or breaking up.  
We make a number of contributions to the literature on marital and relationship conflict. 
First, we study the increase in conflict using longitudinal data, which is the ideal design 
for examining the causal mechanisms between the loss of relative resources in couples and 
relationship conflict. Second, we analyze the dynamics of relationship conflict, taking into 
account a competing risk framework in which unbearable levels of disagreement can lead 
to divorce or separation. Third, we analyze relationship conflict in countries where 
policies, gender roles and identities in family life are substantially different, making our 
results particularly relevant to the effect of contextual factors.  
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Our results indicate that men’s job loss is related to the transition to high conflict for both 
men and women. In our view, this demonstrates that challenging hegemonic masculinity—
i.e., men with lower status than their female partner—is often associated with situations of 
conflict. Interestingly, we also find that the transition to high conflict is more frequent in 
countries where the discrepancy between policy design and prevalent family models is 
largest and where its citizens have more often rather traditional gender egalitarian views. 
In addition, we find that men and women separate or divorce more often – after controlling 
for individual-level composition effects – in the three Western European countries of our 
sample (all ‘Conservative’ welfare regimes) than in Eastern European countries. We 
discuss the policy implications of our results in the concluding section.  
 
What Causes Conflict in Romantic Relationships? Relative Resources, Gender 
Roles, and Male Power 
Conflicts and disagreements are common aspects of any relationship (Theiss & Leustek, 
2016). However, when disagreements arise very frequently, they often reflect situations of 
hostility, which can be particularly harmful to couples and other family members (McCoy 
et al., 2013). Studies have shown that there are different issues associated with marital 
conflict, such as money management (Papp, Cummings, & Goeke-Morey 2009), 
household division of labor (Perry-Jenkins and Folk 1994; Kluwer, Heesink, & Vliert, 
1997), the use of flexible work in dual-earner couples with children (Radcliffe & Cassell, 
2015), and even women’s participation in the labor market (Macmillan & Gartner, 2018). 
Yet most of these studies have not examined the dynamics of conflict, that is, the causal 
factors motivating the shift to hostile and unhealthy relationships. Therefore, in this 
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section, we analyze the main theories and empirical evidence that contribute to our 
understanding of the dynamics of relationship conflict.  
Two dominant theories have been used jointly to explain marital conflict: resource theory 
and feminist theories. The main premise of resource theory is that couples’ bargaining 
power depends on the individual assets of each partner. Resources can either be symbolic 
like social prestige or material like income or wealth (Blood & Wolfe 1960). Most theorists 
using this framework have analyzed the consequences of resource imbalance for couples 
in different dimensions, such as housework or the gender division of paid and unpaid work 
(Perry-Jenkins & Folk, 1994; Kluwer, Heesink, & Vliert 1997). The idea is that the partner 
with more absolute resources (e.g., he or she has a job or higher status) or with more 
relative resources in dimensions such as earnings, occupational status, or education can 
more easily impose his or her preferences in the household because inequalities in the 
distribution of resources often entail gender asymmetry in power and decision-making 
(van Damme and Dykstra 2018; Evertsson and Nermo 2007; Hobson 1990; Killewald 
2016; Nitsche and Grunow 2016; Ruppanner 2010). The theory also assumes that people 
try to maximize their individual satisfaction at the expense of their partners who have fewer 
absolute or relative resources. When we apply this theory to the realm of intimate partner 
violence, the rationale is that violence is instrumental and emerges as a result of a total loss 
of access to resources or an imbalance in access to resources in the household (Hornung, 
McCullough, & Sugimoto, 1981). A lack of power in one aspect of the couple relationship 
may be compensated for in another aspect.  
Resource theory is very useful in explaining the risk that women experience abuse or 
conflictual relationships. However, this framework alone cannot explain why imbalanced 
resources lead to conflict in certain circumstances, as it ignores the importance of gender 
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roles in couples’ interactions. Adding feminist theories helps us better understand why 
changes in relative resources can lead to conflict. At the heart of these theories are two 
main concepts: (1) gender roles, which prescribe the ideal behavior and attitudes 
considered acceptable, appropriate, or desirable for women and men in a particular society 
and time, and (2) “doing gender,” which is defined as the daily performance of “a complex 
of socially guided perceptual, interactional, and micropolitical activities that cast particular 
pursuits as expressions of masculine and feminine ‘nature’” (West & Zimmerman, 2016: 
126). The main idea is that women and men display their gender in the context of the 
family. In societies with a traditional gender division of labor, men are expected to perform 
the male breadwinner role and women the main caregiver role. In the scenario of a new 
gender balance in which women have higher status and more relative resources, men may 
use violence to restore their power in the relationship and display hegemonic masculinity 
(Connell 2005; Macmillan & Gartner 2018; Wojnicka, 2015). In other words, intimate 
partner violence and conflict are more likely to occur when men’s authority in the 
household is threatened by women’s higher power in the relationship.    
Empirical studies using the framework of relative resources have obtained mixed results, 
and the relationship between individual resources and marital conflict remains unclear. For 
instance, Villarreal (2007) used resource theory to predict intimate partner violence in 
Mexico as an example of a country with traditional gender norms (e.g., 40% of Mexican 
women need their husbands’ permission to work outside the home). He explored the 
association between male violence and female employment. In his study, violence was 
understood as a compensatory mechanism that allows men to maintain a dominant position 
in the relationship when they lose power. However, the results did not support the 
hypothesis of relative resources, but Villarreal found a correlation between women’s 
absolute resources and gender-based violence. That is, an increase in women’s absolute 
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resources and independence through paid work reduced the likelihood of male violence. 
However, this study was based on cross-sectional data and failed to comprehensively 
explore the dynamics of violence.    
In contrast, the study by Hatch and Bulcroft (2004) used data from the US to study the 
main determinants of conflict. The authors were particularly interested in exploring the 
relationship between marriage duration and the levels of disagreement. Apart from that it 
turned out that marriage duration has a complex relationship with the frequency of marital 
disagreements, the authors found that disagreements were more common among young 
and middle-aged couples and couples with children. However, selective attrition also 
played a role; couples with frequent disagreements were more likely to divorce or separate. 
Interestingly, the level of disagreement was higher among dual-earner couples than male 
breadwinner couples (i.e., employed husbands and housewives). This result was explained 
by the mediating role of the respondents’ gender ideology. Indeed, their agreement with 
traditional gender roles significantly reduced marital conflict, with women adopting a 
more submissive role and avoiding or withdrawing from conflict. According to Hatch and 
Bulcroft (2004), this explained the lower levels of disagreement among older and more 
conservative couples. The main implication of their study is that disagreements between 
couples in general are expected to increase in more egalitarian societies favoring 
constructive dialogue and differences. 
Similarly, Atkinson, Greenstein, and Lang (2005) argued that gender violence is not so 
much related to absolute or relative resources, but to the gender ideology of couple 
members. They found that women’s higher income did not pose a threat to their husbands’ 
masculinity as long as the male respondents had an egalitarian gender ideology. Alonso-
borrego and Carrasco (2017) also found that the risk of physical abuse was lower among 
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couples with egalitarian values in Spain. However, both studies only used one case study 
with cross-sectional data and overlooked differences between policies and behavioral 
outcomes at the societal level. Based on current evidence, it is difficult to determine the 
relationship between marital conflict in intimate relationships (at the micro level) and 
socio-economic factors at the societal level. More comparative studies are needed to 
understand the role of context (Gracia & Merlo, 2016), as we do in this study.  
Based on previous research, we test two main hypotheses: a hypothesis at the micro-level, 
which explores the role of relative resources on relationship conflict, and a macro-level 
hypothesis between the societal level and the individual level, exploring the role of the 
national context in the existence of different levels of relationship conflict or separation. 
First, we expect a decrease in the status of men to be associated with a significant increase 
in the level of conflict and in the risk of break up: the Gender Status Incongruence 
Hypothesis. We call it “status incongruence” because men’s loss of status within the couple 
violates traditional gender roles and expectations. Couples’ relative resources are 
measured by the change in the employment and occupational status of each partner over 
time.  
We also expect that the risk of relationship conflict and separation depends on the national 
context. Macro-level factors, such as prevalent models of work-family arrangements (i.e., 
partners’ working hours in paid and unpaid work) and family policies, may explain the 
levels of relationship conflict. The national context can influence the levels of relationship 
conflict by favoring family life or, conversely, by creating tension within the family. In 
particular, we predict that in countries where family policies are aligned with prevalent 
family-work arrangements, the likelihood of experiencing a transition to high conflict will 
be lower than in countries where both variables are aligned: the Family Policy Model Gap 
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Hypothesis. Family-work arrangements refer to the main type of employment model in 
couples, for instance, whether most couples in a country follow the male breadwinner 
family model (only men work full-time and women are full-time homemakers), the one-
and-a-half breadwinner model (men work full-time and women part-time), or the dual-
earner family model (both partners work full-time). The family policy model gap refers to 
the discrepancy between the common family model in a country and state support for that 
model. Thus, in a society where the dual-earner family model prevails but families cannot 
count on generous state support to reconcile paid work and family responsibilities, we 
expect the large discrepancy between daily needs and the constraints of a good work-
family balance to put pressure on couples. Therefore, the outbreak of high levels of conflict 
and divorce will differ based on the level of discrepancy between prevalent work-family 
arrangements and state support to achieve a good work-family balance.  
Table 1 includes several indicators for the countries analyzed. It reveals substantial 
differences in terms of state support for families, prevalent work-family arrangements, and 
gender values. According to these indicators and as indicated in the last column (Family 
Policy Model Gap), we identify three main contexts:  
(1) Low discrepancy country: strong male breadwinner model, characterized by very 
limited state support for family responsibilities and relatively traditional gender values at 
the societal level. This group is represented by Georgia, with very low scores for divorce 
tolerance and access to divorce, low scores for women’s actual participation in paid work, 
and high scores for adherence to male breadwinner norms. In this context, male 
breadwinner families prevail, combined with non-existent state support for women to 
combine work and care and non-existent informal support for women to do paid work. In 
general, this system works well, unless the behavior of couples does not fit this male 
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breadwinner model or men do not assume their (financial) responsibilities. In this case, 
tensions may arise, but we expect that in general, women will not question their intra-
household division of labor, will not express their disagreement with certain situations 
(Hobson, 1990), and above all will not leave their partner (even if they may be in a situation 
of financial stress).   
(2) Average discrepancy countries: one-and-a-half breadwinner model, characterized by 
couples with average scores for traditional gender role values, divorce tolerance and access 
to divorce, women’s actual participation in paid work, and adherence to male breadwinner 
norms – Note that these countries score the highest in our analytical sample because we 
have no typical egalitarian countries (e.g., the Nordic countries) in our sample. Public 
spending on families and state support to reconcile work and care are higher than in the 
previous group. This group is represented by Austria, Germany, and France. The most 
egalitarian nation in the dataset is France in terms of attitudes and scope of care services 
and financial support. Intuitively, this one-and-a-half breadwinner model should work 
quite well in this cluster of countries, as formal family support via policies is relatively in 
line with couples’ expectations of the state; i.e., the state supports women financially and 
in kind to stay at home (at least until the children are of school age). Thus, from this 
perspective, there should be less tension and conflict in general in these societies. 
However, when comparing the level of egalitarian norms with the average behavior of 
couples, we see a difference between these two indicators. Couples seem to generally 
adhere to more egalitarian norms of the division of labor than what they show in their 
actual behavior, with most women working part-time. Therefore, we expect some 
dissatisfaction with the intra-household division of labor and disagreements expressed 
about it, eventually leading to separation for some couples.  
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(3) High discrepancy countries: dual-earners family model, characterized by couples with 
relatively traditional gender role values, high divorce rates, and high female participation 
in the labor force. The countries represented in this group are Eastern European countries: 
Bulgaria, Russia, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic. They all have in common virtually 
no financial and care support from the state for families, although in the Czech Republic 
(which we group in this cluster because of its high divorce rate and the predominance of 
the dual-earner work-family arrangement), care services have remained considerably high 
since the fall of the wall. Overall, this gap between policy and behavior/culture is likely to 
create tension and conflict in couples, especially when one partner loses his or her job. 
Financial precariousness may occur in combination with many other family problems, 
such as alcohol addiction (Malyutina et al. 2004), making it difficult for families to make 
ends meet. Therefore, we expect that especially in these “regime” types, relationship 
conflict (and the risk of separation) will be high. 
Bulgaria is also included in this cluster despite its “hybrid” model. In this country, 
adherence to egalitarianism is relatively low and the different work-family arrangements 
are of equal size, i.e. dual-earner families and families in which both partners are 
unemployed. Note also that this country has a relatively high number of female 
breadwinner families (see Appendix, Table A1). These hybrid arrangements are combined 
with some family support, especially long parental leave, although the earnings 
compensation is rather low. For this relatively low support context with a combination of 
different work-family arrangements, we also expect fairly high levels of conflict. 
In short, we expect more relationship conflict in the Eastern European countries 
(Bulgaria, Russia, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic), where there is a discrepancy 
between the prevalent family model and state support, and less couple conflict in 
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Western nations (Germany, France, and Austria) and Georgia, respectively, where 
practices and policies are more aligned. Potential confounding contextual factors 
An important contextual change that happened during the years of interview of the GGS 
(2004-2013) concerns the economic situation. We portray changes in this situation by 
showing the unemployment rate per country over the years 2004 till 2013 (see Table A2 
in the appendix). A brief look at the Table immediately shows that most countries do not 
experience an economic downturn with rising unemployment rates during this period, but 
in contrast decreasing unemployment rates. We observe only for Georgia and Lithuania a 
severe increase in the unemployment rates over the studied GGS period (for both from 
2006 to 2009). For men, scholars have found that the unemployment context does not 
impact upon the individual unemployment effect on separation. For women, loss of a job 
when the national unemployment rate is low may be less stressful than during periods of 
high unemployment (Solaz et al. 2020). Therefore, we expect to not find a large influence 
of the macro-level context on men’s unemployment effect. In contrast, for women, if we 
find a moderating effect of the unemployment context, it would be weak and only 
occurring in (reference country) Georgia and Lithuania. 
 
Data and Methods 
The study is based on wave 1 (2004-2007) and wave 2 (2007-2013) of the GGS for eight 
countries (Bulgaria, Russia, Georgia, Germany, France, Austria, Lithuania, and the Czech 
Republic). We select men (N = 8,490) and women (N = 11,541) aged 18 to 60 who are 
present in both waves and with the same partner to analyze the change over time in their 
level of conflict. After attrition and excluding missing values on independent variables, we 
are left with an analytical sample of 8,199 women and 5,665 men. In this analysis, we take 
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into account the fact that during the three years between the two waves, conflicts between 
partners may have been so high that the couples broke up. This implies that we do not 
observe the transition to high conflict for these couples. To control for the possibility of 
separation (rather than staying in the relationship), we perform competing risk analysis on 
the person-wave file, i.e., multinomial logistic regression with three outcomes: (1) stay in 
a calm situation (no conflict or low conflict); (2) transition to high conflict; and (3) 
separate.  
Theoretically, we could distinguish a fourth competing risk: attrition. However, this 
outcome is difficult to add to this analysis, as we include variables that change between 
waves 1 and 2. As a sensitivity analysis, we use multinomial logistic regression with 
attrition as the fourth possible outcome and include only wave 1 variables (see appendix, 
Table A3 for the correlates of attrition). Attrition is relatively high in some countries and 
ranges from 15% for women in Georgia to 80% for men in Lithuania. We find that attrition 
is related to low-educated couples, being older, traditional, less committed to marriage, 
cohabiting, having separated parents, and having poor health. This suggests that in general, 
more disadvantaged people drop out between waves 1 and 2, although being older when 
the union was formed are also factors indicating attrition. If disadvantaged people leave 
the GGS panel and this is positively related to a higher likelihood of conflict or separation, 
we are left with a selective panel of more advantaged men and women. If on top of that, 
we expect the loss of male power to be more common in the more disadvantaged 
population, it seems likely that we underestimate the relationship between the loss of male 
power and our outcomes of interest. Most importantly, we believe that key in this 
estimation is the finding that more traditional respondents are more likely to drop out in 
the second wave. This leads us to expect that, if our sample suffers from any bias, we will 
underestimate the impact of status inconsistencies in couples on the transition to conflict 
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or separation because we observe less traditional couples (that are expected to be more 
sensitive to status inconsistencies). 
We analyze men and women separately because the level of disagreement is only captured 
at the individual level (i.e., not couple data). We know the respondents’ perception of 
disagreement, but we do not know their partners’ feelings. However, comparing men and 
women appears relevant as they report slightly different answers (see Tables 2 and 3). 
Women report more transitions to a hostile situation and to separation, while men are 
slightly more mobile in socio-economic terms between the two GGS waves than women. 
Disagreement index and transition to a high conflict situation 
We approach couple conflict through the severity of disagreements in daily interactions. 
To measure the level of disagreement in the relationship, we create a disagreement index 
of eight items related to interactions: household chores, money, use of leisure time, sex, 
relationships with friends, relationships with parents and in-laws, having children, and 
drinking alcohol. A ninth item related to child rearing issues is analyzed separately only 
for couples with children. The reliability of the scale is 0.81 in waves 1 and 2. 
The transition to a high conflict situation occurs when in wave 1 the respondent reported 
a conflict level less than 2.5 out of 5, while (s)he reported a level of 2.5 or more in wave 
2. Therefore, we construct the following variable: 0 “stable or transition to a low level of 
conflict” (< 2.5 in both waves); 1 “transition to a high level of conflict” (from < 2.5 to > 
2.5); and 2 “separate.” Figures A1a and b in the appendix present the distribution of the 
disagreement index by country. Some countries show a more right-skewed distribution of 
the level of disagreement than others. Notice the similarity of the distributions between 
men and women in the same country (even though this is not couple data). 
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Main explanatory variables: Loss of male power 
We use two variables to capture the loss of male power in the couple (see Table 2 for 
descriptive statistics): i) job loss: 0 “no job loss” (baseline); 1 “job loss of the male 
partner”; 2 “job loss of the female partner.” Note that the job loss of both partners is 
included in the “job loss of the male partner” category because this category is too small 
to be analyzed on its own. ii) Change in the relative socio-economic status of the partners: 
0 “no change in the relative socio-economic status of the partners” (the ISEI [International 
Socio-Economic Index] scores of the partners are the same between the two waves); 1 “an 
increase in the ISEI score of the female partner”; 2 “a decrease in the ISEI score of the 
male partner.”  
Job loss is based on a change to a non-employment activity status of the respondent or the 
partner. ISEI scores are a standard measure in the literature to capture socio-economic 
status and are converted from ISCO codes. They combine an education and income 
component as a proxy for the respondents’ occupational status. More specifically, ISEI 
scores refer to an occupation’s main antecedent (education) and main consequence 
(earnings) as its formative parts. Hence, ISEI scores capture the cultural and economic 
resources that are typical of the incumbents of a certain occupation. This leads to ISEI 
scores between 16 and 90. For more information on the construction of ISEI scores, see 
Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman (1992) and Ganzeboom’s webpage: 
http://www.harryganzeboom.nl/ISCO88/index.htm. ISCED codes refer to cross-national 





Our multinomial logistic regression models include the context to test the Family Policy 
Model Gap Hypothesis. As previously described, we distinguish three contexts: (1) Low 
discrepancy country: strong male breadwinner model (Georgia); (2) Average discrepancy 
countries: one-and-a-half breadwinner model (Germany, France, Austria); and (3) High 
discrepancy countries: dual-earners family model (Bulgaria, Russia, Lithuania, the Czech 
Republic). 
Control variables 
As shown in Table 2, we consider various control variables. At the couple level, we use 
the following controls: relative education of the partners: 0 “both partners have little 
education (ISCED 0-3)”; 1 “both partners are highly educated (ISCED 4-6),” but “she is 
more educated (ISCED 4-6) than him (ISCED 0-3)”; 2 “she is less educated (ISCED 0-3) 
than him (ISCED 4-6)”; marital status: married (baseline), premarital cohabitation, or 
cohabiting; age of the respondent when the union was formed; no change in the number of 
children (baseline), having a child added to the household (either by birth, adoption, or 
return to the household), or losing a child; and change in the respondent’s perception of 
making ends meet (from very easy to somewhat difficult to difficult or very difficult). 
In addition, we consider the following individual-level variables: age; age^2; ISEI score 
quartile or missing (baseline) to capture the floor or ceiling effects of the change in 
occupational status; health (1 “very good” to 5 “very poor”); average score for the index 
of egalitarian values for the following items, from 1 “strongly agree” to 5 “strongly 
disagree” (higher scores indicate more egalitarian values): “In a couple, it is better for the 
man to be older than the woman”; “If a woman earns more than her partner, it is not good 
for the relationship”; “In general, men make better political leaders than women”; “A 
preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works”; “If their parents divorce, it 
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is better for the children to stay with the mother than with the father” (alpha = 0.63); 
average score for the commitment index for the following items, from 1 “strongly agree” 
to 5 “strongly disagree” (higher scores indicate more commitment to marriage): “Marriage 
is an outdated institution”; “It is fine for unmarried couples to live together even if they 
have no interest in marriage”; “Marriage is a relationship for life and should never be 
ended”; and “It is fine for a couple with an unhappy marriage to get a divorce even if they 
have children” (alpha = 0.60).  
Descriptive outcome variable 
Table 3 presents the percentages of men and women belonging to each of our outcome 
categories: stay in low conflict, transition to high conflict, or separate/divorce. Attrition is 
not included because it would distort the picture of our dependent variable too much. The 
proportion of couples increasing their level of conflict varies from 2% to 12% for men and 
from 3% to 11% for women, while the proportion of couples having broken up between 
the two waves is higher in some countries than in others (see Table 3). Indeed, we observe 
a significant variation between the countries. On one side, we have a group of countries 
characterized by very few transitions to conflict and separation, Bulgaria and Georgia. On 
the other side, some countries have unbalanced levels for both outcomes: Austria has a 
high level of separation but a low level of conflict, while Russia is the opposite, with a 
high level of conflict but a low level of separation (when based on men’s responses). 
Finally, France, Germany, and Lithuania present medium and balanced levels of separation 





We explore the factors determining the transition to high conflict or union dissolution 
separately for men and women (see Table 4). As previously explained, using multinomial 
logistic regression with three alternative outcomes—(i) stay in low conflict (baseline), ii) 
transition to high conflict, iii) separation—allows us to avoid the bias that separation may 
have on our results because of the strong correlation between relationship conflict and 
union dissolution. The models include a wide range of socio-demographic characteristics 
at the individual and couple levels that are important to control and the main explanatory 
variables related to the theory of relative resources: job loss and upgrading or downgrading 
of occupational status. The models also include an additional country-level variable for the 
family policy model gap. 
Table 4 shows that men’s job loss increases couple conflict according to both men’s and 
women’s responses (0.604 (p<0.001) and 0.423 (p<0.001), respectively). Men are 
exp(.604) = 1.83 times more likely to transition to a conflict situation after losing their job 
between the two GGS waves, while the odds ratio is 1.53 based on women’s responses. In 
contrast, women’s job loss is not important for the transition to high conflict. This result 
obtained by controlling for other individual characteristics and for the family policy gap 
model at the country level is a clear indication of the importance of the loss of male power, 
which we theoretically relate to the challenge of hegemonic masculinity and the risk of 
conflict. This is reinforced by our results (Table 4) on the role of job loss in the risk of 
separation: when the husband loses his job, the risk of separation also increases for men 
(0.562 (p<0.05)), but not for women.  
When considering our additional measures for the loss of male power (upgrading of her 
occupational status or downgrading of his occupational status), we observe that for men, 
these measures are positively associated with an increase in conflict (especially her 
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upgrade = 0.275 (p<0.05)), while for women, they are associated with a decrease in 
conflict, although the coefficients are not statistically significant (Table 4). However, they 
are positively associated with separation (upgrading of her occupational status for men = 
0.972 (p<0.001) and downgrading of his occupational status for women = 0.517 
(p<0.001)).  
Our results also clearly show that the context is important and that the gap between policy 
and family models at the country level is a determinant of the quality and stability of 
relationships. Compared with the context of a low discrepancy country (Georgia), the risk 
of increasing conflict is highest in countries with a high discrepancy (1.067 (p<0.001) for 
women and 1.471 (p<0.001) for men; Bulgaria, Russia, Lithuania, and the Czech 
Republic), while the risk of separation is highest in countries with an average discrepancy 
(3.168 (p<0.001) for women and 2.921 (p<0.001) for men; Austria, Germany, and France). 
The effect sizes are more or less similar for men and women. That the impact of family 
policy-behavior discrepancy on separation is not linear may have to do with the relatively 
large sample size of Bulgaria and its comparatively low divorce rate that makes the cluster 
of Eastern European countries less divorce probable.  
Finally, our models include additional socio-economic and socio-demographic variables. 
For the socio-economic situation of couples, we observe that for women, there is a positive 
effect of low job status (0.428 (p<0.01) for the first quartile) on the risk of transition to 
high conflict. Note that although we control for the change in the respondents’ perceived 
economic situation, we do not take into account the actual economic living conditions of 
the couples in wave 1. Therefore, women with occupational status in the first quartile are 
very likely to be poor and thus might have more financial problems to fight about. Why 
we do not find the same for men is puzzling, although the effect is in the same “positive” 
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direction. In terms of couples’ relative education, we only find a significant difference 
between highly educated homogamous couples and low-educated homogamous couples, 
and the former are more likely to transition to a high conflict situation but less likely to 
separate (men’s responses). The main socio-demographic characteristics are associated 
with different risks of separation – in line with general data on divorce trends, the presence 
of children and cohabiting instead of being married are important determinants of the risk 
of union dissolution –, but not really with the risk of experiencing a transition to high 
conflict. The arrival of a new child in the home (-0.472 (p<0.001)), having egalitarian 
gender values (-1.95 (p<0.05)), and being highly committed to the relationship (-0.167 
(p<0.05)) are factors that protect men from transitioning to high conflict, while 
cohabitation (0.365 (p<0.001)) is associated with a higher risk of experiencing this 
transition for men. Finally, for both men and women, an increasingly more difficult 
economic situation seems to increase relationship conflict.  
Overall, these results allow us to confirm that as postulated in our Gender Status 
Incongruence Hypothesis, the loss of male power in the couple (expressed through men’s 
job loss) leads to a higher probability of transitioning to a high-conflict situation. Our 
results also confirm that as postulated in our Family Policy Model Gap Hypothesis, when 
the discrepancy between prevalent family models and state support is large, most couples 
are forced to adopt dual-earner arrangements in the face of not-fully-egalitarian gender 
norms and family policies. Therefore, we confirm our initial idea that considering the 
context when analyzing the change in relationship conflict is necessary when we want to 
understand the effect of the loss of male power, which can have a negative effect on the 
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quality of relationships based on the existence of a normative context of hegemonic 
masculinity.1Conclusions and discussion 
This research had two objectives. First, we wanted to understand why some heterosexual 
couples are more likely to experience high levels of couple conflict. Second, we wanted to 
understand to what extent high levels of couple conflict are related to the discrepancy 
between prevailing family arrangements (the typical work-family balance of each partner) 
and practical state support for families at the country level. Based on feminist theories and 
the theory of relative resources, we hypothesized that the experience of men losing their 
status in the couple can lead to high levels of conflict, as it challenges expected gender 
roles in traditional societies. Our results (partly) confirm our Gender Status Incongruence 
Hypothesis for certain dimensions of relative resources (most importantly, job loss). In 
particular, the results reveal that when a man loses his job, it increases the likelihood of a 
couple shifting to a situation of severe relationship disagreements.  
We also hypothesized that different levels of discrepancy between prevalent work-family 
arrangements, policy design, and gender values at the societal level would lead to different 
levels of relationship conflict. Our sample includes the following categories: “low 
discrepancy: strong male breadwinner family model in a traditional society with a non-
supportive state” (Georgia); “average discrepancy: one-and-a-half breadwinner family 
model in a rather egalitarian society with an average supportive state” (Germany, France, 
Austria); and “high discrepancy: dual-earners family model in a society that more and 
more develops into a traditional direction of gender role values and with a non-supportive 
state” (Bulgaria, Russia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic). We find that in line with our 
 
1 We have also performed country fixed effects analyses. These results are presented in appendix Tables A4 and A5. 




hypothesis, the likelihood of experiencing high couple conflict varies with the level of 
discrepancy. The results indicate that the transition to high conflict is more frequent in 
countries characterized by average and high discrepancies between prevalent work-family 
arrangements and limited state support for working parents, respectively. We also find that 
a larger family policy model gap increases the likelihood of separation or divorce (although 
this effect is not “linear” and separation occurs more frequently in the average discrepancy 
context than in the high discrepancy context). 
In addition, we observe gender differences in the perception of conflict; in particular, we 
find gender differences in the association between transition to conflict and men’s job loss. 
This result is consistent with that of previous studies. For instance, Hatch and Bulcroft 
(2004) found that men reported more frequent marital disagreements than women, which 
they interpreted as the result of societies moving toward more gender egalitarian values 
and men feeling increasingly misplaced. However, other studies (Heaton & Blake, 1999) 
using data from matched partners have found similar reports of marital disagreements 
between men and women. Further analysis with larger datasets and longer observation 
periods may shed more light on gender differences in the perception of conflict. 
We want to mention one important limitation of our study: we could not investigate a 
moderation by gender norms (or values on the individual level) of the relationship between 
men’s job loss and the transition to high conflict between couples. This is because of lack 
of power due to the small sample size of the available countries in the panel version of 
GGS. We are looking forward to future research examining this, especially since our 
sample is relatively traditional with the absence of Nordic European countries. A 
comparison with the Nordic countries would give us a better idea of the validity of the 




In summary, only certain dimensions of couples’ relative resources seem to be 
significantly related to high levels of conflict (i.e., men’s job loss). Even though not all 
measures of changes in power have a significant impact, the effect of men’s job loss is in 
line with relative resource theory and more specifically with the gender status 
incongruence hypothesis. This implies that for couples where men are losing power (i.e. 
men are losing their job), the likelihood is higher that conflict levels rise to severe conflict. 
In our view, this shows that challenging hegemonic masculinity—i.e., men have lower 
status than their female partner—is often associated with situations of conflict. In addition, 
we found that couples in certain contexts experience more conflict and have a higher risk 
to break-up. However, more countries are needed to identify better the specific policies at 
the country level that help reduce destructive levels of couple conflict due to status 
incongruence in couples. With more countries, a multi-level analysis could be done and 
one could look at cross-level interaction effects (i.e. to what extent does men’s job loss 
have a higher impact in certain contexts than in other and why). In any case, although other 
factors (such as the economic situation of countries or path dependency) may play a role, 
we can carefully conclude that the main policy lesson of our study is that the transition to 
high relationship conflict is lower in countries where work-family arrangements are 
aligned with prevalent gender values and family policies. As a result, broad and generous 
policies combining work and care for families in a fair and equal way for both partners are 
essential to avoid conflict and hostile situations between couples, which can eventually 
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Table 1. Family policy model gap and contextual indicators for the eight GGS countries 




coverage rate for 
preschool children 
(aged 3-6) (2000)b  
Maternity 








on family benefits 
in cash and 
services as % of 
GDP (2005)e 
Sum of policy 





















and WFA)  
GE  28 18m 50p N.A.u -- Male 
breadwinner  
2.38 0.4 Low  
AT 5.4i 68 16  104 2.89 + One-and-a-half  
breadwinner 
3.24 2.4 Average 
DE 4j 78 14 104 2.03 + One-and-a-half  
breadwinner 
3.24 2.4 Average 
FR 7 99 16  156 2.93 ++ One-and-a-half  
breadwinner 
3.39 2.5 Average 
BG Half/full dayk 67 19  104q N.A. 0 Hybrid 2.68 1.9 High 
CZ 9 85 28  156 2.05 + Dual-earner  2.86 3.1 High  
LT  50 18n 52 1.72 -- Dual-earner  2.76 3.3 High  
RU 6l 68 18o 78r N.A. -- Dual-earner  2.56 4.2 High  
Sources: a Family Policy Database, version 2 (2003):own calculations: weekly hours/5, 2003 (retrieved April 29 2010) ; b OECD(2001); RU, BG, GE: TransMONEE 2007 Database, UNICEF (2007) 
(retrieved 29/06/2010); c www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/Social-Policy/...mat.../Dur-mat-lea.xls (retrieved May 23, 2018); d OECD family database 
http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm (retrieved 29/06/2010); RU, BG: The Clearinghouse on International Developments on Child, Youth and Family Policies (2004); e Public spending 
accounted for here concerns public support that is exclusively for families (e.g. child payments and allowances, parental leave benefits and childcare support), only (excluding tax measures). 
Spending in other social policy areas such as health and housing support also assists families, but not exclusively, and is not included here. OECD family database 
http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm (retrieved 29/05/2020); f Generations and Gender Suvery, own calculations, first wave (country aggregated index gender role values, see 
operationalization in text); g Generations and Gender Suvery, own calculations, first wave, see appendix for distribution of work-family arrngements; h Demographic Yearbook United Nations; 
i http://www.expatfocus.com/expatriate-austria-education-schools; j Data for Germany for 2000. Family Policy Database – Gornick / OECD (2002). Babies and Bosses: Reconciling Work and 
Family Life https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/babies-and-bosses-reconciling-work-and-family-life_9789264032477-en#page122 (retrieved may 22, 2020); ; k 
Eurydice: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/eurydice/index.php/Bulgaria:Organisation_of_Early_Childhood_Education_and_Care; l 
https://www.justlanded.com/english/Russia/Russia-Guide/Education/Russian-Schools; m https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/issr.12128 and correspondence with Dimitri 
Gugushvili (May 20, 2018); n Pascall and Kwak, 2005; 0 Gerber and Perelli-Harris (2012); p https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parental_leave#Europe_and_Central_Asia (retrieved may 7, 2018); q 
Data for 2000. After 6 months minimum wage instead of 90% payment; r Data for 2000. After 28 weeks minimum wage instead of 100% payment; u Correspondence with Dimitri Gugushvili 
(May 20, 2018). 
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Table 2. Description of variables (percentages/means (standard deviations))  
  Women’s report Men’s report 
Job loss No job loss  
His job loss 







Change in the occupational status of one of the 
partners 









Occupational status (quartiles) Missing job status  
Lower quartile  













Education level and similarity of the couple  Both low 
Both high 
High for her, low for him 









Age of the respondent   39 (9.4) 41 (9.4) 
Health  2.18 (0.86) 2.07 (0.83) 
Gender role values  2.97 (0.74) 2.92 (0.75) 
Relationship commitment   2.83 (0.70) 2.90 (0.71) 
Marital status married 








Change in number of children  No change 
‘Having’ a child 







Change toward difficulty making ends meet  12 11 
 
 
Table 3. Description of the percentage for each outcome category, women and men 
 Women Men 
Country – Outcome 










Bulgaria (BG) 94 4.8 1.5 2,011 93 4.3 2.7 1,302 
Russia (RU) 81 11 7.7 1,242 85 12 3.6 861 
Georgia (GE) 96 3.4 0.4 1,430 98 2 0.3 954 
Germany (DE) 87 6.4 6.1 391 90 5.1 5.1 195 
France (FR) 87 6.6 6.1 1,457 92 4 4.1 1,156 
Austria (AT) 87 3.8 9.3 1,368 85 4.2 11 856 
Lithuania (LT) 87 8.3 4.8 228 91 5.2 3.4 291 
Czech Republic (CZ) 85 6.9 8.3 72 86 12 2 50 





Table 4. Multinomial logistic regression comparing transition into high conflict or separation 
with reference category no transition. Women. 
 conflict separation 
No jobloss ref ref 
His jobloss 0.423* -0.442 
 (2.16) (-1.16) 
Her jobloss -0.176 0.212 
 (-0.67) (0.82) 
Upgrade of her status wave 1 to wave 2 -0.135 0.142 
 (-1.15) (1.13) 
Downgrade of his status wave 1 to wave 2 -0.113 0.517*** 
 (-0.98) (4.40) 
Job status missing ref ref 
Job status first quartile 0.428** 0.641*** 
 (2.69) (3.25) 
Job status second quartile 0.089 0.584*** 
 (0.57) (3.17) 
Job status third quartile 0.203 0.594** 
 (1.23) (2.97) 
Job status top quartile 0.120 0.342 
 (0.69) (1.55) 
Lag.her education low, his education low ref ref 
Lag.her education high, his education high 0.158 0.183 
 (1.23) (1.26) 
Lag.her education high, his education low 0.118 0.197 
 (0.80) (1.18) 
Lag.her education low, his education high 0.096 0.069 
 (0.61) (0.40) 
Lag.age -0.038 -0.115** 
 (-0.95) (-2.48) 
Lag.age^2 0.000 0.001 
 (0.30) (1.36) 
Lag.health (higher score, poorer health) 0.302*** 0.432*** 
 (4.68) (6.00) 
Lag.values (higher score, more egalitarian) 0.032 -0.124 
 (0.39) (-1.38) 
Lag.commitment (higher score, more 
committed) 
0.028 -0.355*** 
 (0.36) (-3.94) 
Lag.Married ref ref 
Lag.Premarital cohabitation -0.184* 0.132 
 (-1.65) (0.87) 
Lag.Cohabiting 0.123 0.884*** 
 (0.83) (5.16) 
No change in number of children ref ref 
‘Having’ a child 0.059 -0.577** 
 (0.45) (-2.97) 
‘Losing’ a child 0.103 1.965*** 
 (0.24) (7.86) 
Transition to difficult to ‘Make ends meet’ 0.261* 0.403** 
 (1.88) (2.47) 
Low discrepancy ref ref 
Average discrepancy 0.854*** 3.168*** 
 (0.128) (0.188) 
High discrepancy  1.067*** 2.405*** 
 (0.213) (0.453) 
_cons -3.374*** -3.219** 
 (-3.89) (-3.02) 
N 8199 8199 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, one-tailed tested; 




Table 5. Multinomial logistic regression comparing transition into high conflict or separation 
with reference category no transition. Men 
 conflict separation 
No jobloss ref ref 
His jobloss 0.604** 0.562* 
 (2.57) (1.66) 
Her jobloss 0.211 -0.647 
 (0.72) (-1.21) 
Upgrade of her status wave 1 to wave 2 0.275* 0.972*** 
 (2.07) (5.98) 
Downgrade of his status wave 1 to wave 2 0.055 0.255 
 (0.37) (1.41) 
Job status missing ref ref 
Job status first quartile 0.230 0.010 
 (1.11) (0.03) 
Job status second quartile 0.185 0.335 
 (0.79) (1.05) 
Job status third quartile 0.037 0.697* 
 (0.16) (2.23) 
Job status top quartile -0.025 0.683* 
 (-0.10) (2.04) 
Lag.her education low, his education low ref ref 
Lag.her education high, his education high 0.286* -0.429* 
 (1.76) (-2.01) 
Lag.her education high, his education low 0.248 -0.338 
 (1.41) (-1.42) 
Lag.her education low, his education high 0.096 -0.106 
 (0.43) (-0.43) 
Lag.age -0.069 -0.175** 
 (-1.31) (-2.56) 
Lag.age^2 0.000 0.001* 
 (0.70) (1.66) 
Lag.health (higher score, poorer health) 0.218** 0.265** 
 (2.58) (2.36) 
Lag.values (higher score, more egalitarian) -0.195* -0.047 
 (-1.91) (-0.37) 
Lag.commitment (higher score, more 
committed) 
-0.167* -0.312** 
 (-1.69) (-2.47) 
Lag.Married ref ref 
Lag.Premarital cohabitation -0.339* 0.263 
 (-2.24) (1.09) 
Lag.Cohabiting 0.365* 1.414*** 
 (2.02) (5.40) 
No change in number of children ref ref 
‘Having’ a child -0.472** -1.022*** 
 (-2.37) (-3.19) 
‘Losing’ a child 0.016 4.017*** 
 (0.03) (17.15) 
Transition to difficult to ‘Make ends meet’ 0.227 0.267 
 (1.24) (1.01) 
Low discrepancy ref ref 
Average discrepancy 1.145*** 2.921*** 
 (3.89) (4.59) 
High discrepancy  1.471*** 2.222*** 
 (5.59) (3.53) 
_cons -1.821 -2.280 
 (-1.55) (-1.44) 
N 5665 5665 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, one-tailed tested; 






Figure A1a. Summary disagreement index with cut-off point at 2.5, men
 



































































































































































































































































Table A1. Work-family arrangements (WFA) in each country of our analytical sample 
(percentages and dominating model) 















GE 11 9.7 6.5 41 32 Male 
breadwinner  
AT 6.0 33 41 18 2.6 One-and-a-half  
breadwinner 
DE 9.5 19 21 24 27 One-and-a-half  
breadwinner 
FR 8.8 32 15 16 28 One-and-a-half  
breadwinner 
BG 13 37 2.5 15 31 Hybrid 
CZ 6.3 50 4.0 12 28 Dual earner  
LT 8.9 44 5.9 15 26 Dual earner  
RU 11 47 2.8 19 20 Dual earner  




Table A2. Economic situation (unemployment rate) in each country of our analytical sample 
(percentages) per year and the years of interview for two GGS waves 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
GE 12.6 13.8 13.6 13.3 17.9 20.7 20.2 19.6 19.7 19.4 
   Wave 1   Wave 2     
AT 5.8 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.1 5.3 4.8 4.6 4.9 5.3 
     Wave 1 Wave 1   Wave 2 Wave 2 
DE 10.7 11.2 10.3 8.7 7.5 7.7 7.0 5.8 5.4 5.2 
  Wave 1   Wave 2 Wave 2     
FR 8.9 8.5 8.5 7.7 7.1 8.7 8.9 8.8 9.4 9.9 
  Wave 1   Wave 2      
BG 12.0 10.1 9.0 6.9 5.6 6.8 10.3 11.3 12.3 12.9 
 Wave 1   Wave 2       
CZ 8.2 7.9 7.2 5.3 4.4 6.7 7.3 6.7 7.0 7.0 
  Wave 1   Wave 2      
LT 10.7 8.3 5.8 4.3 5.8 13.8 17.8 15.4 13.4 11.8 
   Wave 1   Wave 2     
RU 7.8 7.1 7.1 6.0 6.2 8.3 7.4 6.5 5.4 5.5 
 Wave 1   Wave 2       
Source: World Bank, World development Indicators, unemployment rate as percentage of total labor force. 














Job status missing ref ref ref ref 
Job status first quartile -0.085 0.370*** 0.069 0.243*** 
Job status second quartile -0.189** -0.198*** 0.131 0.546*** 
Job status third quartile -0.105 -0.171** 0.042 -0.021 
Job status top quartile -0.171* -0.194** 0.113 0.190* 
Lag.her education low, his education low ref ref ref ref 
Lag.her education high, his education high -0.142** -0.054 -0.097 -0.115* 
Lag.her education high, his education low -0.079 0.032 -0.131* -0.185** 
Lag.her education low, his education high -0.112* -0.029 -0.117 0.022 
Lag.age -0.069*** -0.136*** -0.051** -0.084*** 
Lag.age^2 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000* 0.001*** 
Lag.health (higher score, poorer health) 0.013 0.054* -0.008 0.056* 
Lag.values (higher score, more egalitarian) -0.154*** -0.014 -0.206*** -0.083** 
Lag.commitment (higher score, more 
committed) 
-0.118*** 0.000 -0.130*** -0.031 
Lag.Married ref ref ref ref 
Lag.Premarital cohabitation -0.016 -0.234*** 0.010 -0.270*** 
Lag.Cohabiting 0.188** -0.057 0.326*** 0.069 
Lag.parental divorce 0.141** 0.123* 0.109 0.048 
Lag.age at union formation 0.012** 0.026*** 0.006 0.018*** 
Lag.number of breakups 0.007 -0.063 0.022 -0.091 
Lag.hincome (deciles) -0.020* 0.110*** -0.014 0.130*** 
Lag.no children 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lag.child under age 6 -0.148* -0.188** 0.024 -0.027 
Lag.child between age 6 and 17 -0.033 -0.045 0.028 -0.070 
Lag.at least one young and one old child -0.359*** -0.305*** -0.251*** -0.304*** 
Georgia ref  ref  
Bulgaria 0.681***  0.515***  
Russia 1.053***  0.958***  
Germany 2.576***  2.610***  
France 1.322***  0.953***  
Austria 0.675***  0.167  
Lithuania 3.185***  2.815***  
Czech Republic 2.543***  2.521***  
Low discrepancy  ref  ref 
Average discrepancy  0.847***  0.576*** 
High discrepancy  1.270***  1.209*** 
_cons 0.605* 0.496 0.712 0.119 
N 13906 13906 10674 10674 
 
Table A4. Multinomial logistic regression comparing transition into high conflict or separation 
with base category no transition into high conflict. Women. 
 conflict conflict separation separation 
No jobloss ref ref ref ref 
His jobloss 0.440* 0.423* -0.312 -0.442 
 (2.23) (2.16) (-0.82) (-1.16) 
Her jobloss -0.104 -0.176 0.369 0.212 
 (-0.39) (-0.67) (1.39) (0.82) 
Upgrade of her status wave 1 to wave 2 -0.089 -0.135 0.187 0.142 
 (-0.73) (-1.15) (1.45) (1.13) 
Downgrade of his status wave 1 to wave 2 -0.075 -0.113 0.502*** 0.517*** 
 (-0.65) (-0.98) (4.21) (4.40) 
Job status missing 0.000 0.000 0.000 ref 
Job status first quartile 0.136 0.428** 0.285 0.641*** 
 (0.81) (2.69) (1.38) (3.25) 
Job status second quartile -0.169 0.089 0.250 0.584*** 
 (-1.03) (0.57) (1.30) (3.17) 
Job status third quartile 0.005 0.203 0.322 0.594** 
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 (0.03) (1.23) (1.56) (2.97) 
Job status top quartile -0.035 0.120 0.040 0.342 
 (-0.19) (0.69) (0.18) (1.55) 
Lag.her education low, his education low    ref 
Lag.her education high, his education high -0.259* 0.158 -0.101 0.183 
 (-1.83) (1.23) (-0.63) (1.26) 
Lag.her education high, his education low -0.164 0.118 -0.065 0.197 
 (-1.06) (0.80) (-0.37) (1.18) 
Lag.her education low, his education high -0.223 0.096 -0.181 0.069 
 (-1.36) (0.61) (-1.01) (0.40) 
Lag.age -0.000 -0.038 -0.083* -0.115** 
 (-0.01) (-0.95) (-1.71) (-2.48) 
Lag.age^2 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (-0.58) (0.30) (0.65) (1.36) 
Lag.health (higher score, poorer health) 0.170** 0.302*** 0.315*** 0.432*** 
 (2.45) (4.68) (4.04) (6.00) 
Lag.values (higher score, more egalitarian) 0.003 0.032 -0.100 -0.124 
 (0.04) (0.39) (-1.06) (-1.38) 
Lag.commitment (higher score, more 
committed) 
-0.070 0.028 -0.528*** -0.355*** 
 (-0.87) (0.36) (-5.58) (-3.94) 
Lag.Married 0.000 0.000 0.000 ref 
Lag.Premarital cohabitation -0.064 -0.184* 0.332* 0.132 
 (-0.56) (-1.65) (2.09) (0.87) 
Lag.Cohabiting 0.149 0.123 0.950*** 0.884*** 
 (1.00) (0.83) (5.44) (5.16) 
No change in number of children 0.000 0.000 0.000 ref 
‘Having’ a child 0.110 0.059 -0.515** -0.577** 
 (0.83) (0.45) (-2.63) (-2.97) 
‘Losing’ a child 0.069 0.103 1.929*** 1.965*** 
 (0.16) (0.24) (7.48) (7.86) 
Transition to difficult to ‘Make ends meet’ 0.224 0.261* 0.430** 0.403** 
 (1.60) (1.88) (2.59) (2.47) 
Georgia ref  ref  
Bulgaria 0.388**  1.079***  
 (0.140)  (0.138)  
Russia 1.493***  3.003***  
 (0.077)  (0.179)  
Germany 0.819***  2.797***  
 (0.134)  (0.182)  
France 1.013***  2.838***  
 (0.111)  (0.246)  
Austria 0.325**  3.109***  
 (0.094)  (0.198)  
Lithuania 1.099***  2.872***  
 (0.068)  (0.099)  
Czech Republic 1.173***  4.141***  
 (0.240)  (0.266)  
Low discrepancy  ref  ref 
Average discrepancy  0.854***  3.168*** 
  (0.128)  (0.188) 
High discrepancy   1.067***  2.405*** 
  (0.213)  (0.453) 
_cons -3.025*** -3.374*** -1.846* -3.219** 
 (-3.47) (-3.89) (-1.78) (-3.02) 
N 8199 8199 8199 8199 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, one-tailed tested; 





Table A5. Multinomial logistic regression comparing transition into high conflict or separation 
with base category no transition into high conflict. Men 
 conflict conflict separation separation 
No jobloss ref ref ref ref 
His jobloss 0.680** 0.604** 0.532 0.562* 
 (2.86) (2.57) (1.56) (1.66) 
Her jobloss 0.381 0.211 -0.620 -0.647 
 (1.29) (0.72) (-1.16) (-1.21) 
Upgrade of her status wave 1 to wave 2 0.209 0.275* 1.026*** 0.972*** 
 (1.53) (2.07) (6.16) (5.98) 
Downgrade of his status wave 1 to wave 2 0.051 0.055 0.250 0.255 
 (0.34) (0.37) (1.38) (1.41) 
Job status missing 0.000 ref 0.000 ref 
Job status first quartile -0.074 0.230 0.006 0.010 
 (-0.34) (1.11) (0.02) (0.03) 
Job status second quartile -0.195 0.185 0.282 0.335 
 (-0.80) (0.79) (0.83) (1.05) 
Job status third quartile -0.226 0.037 0.554* 0.697* 
 (-0.94) (0.16) (1.69) (2.23) 
Job status top quartile -0.287 -0.025 0.503 0.683* 
 (-1.13) (-0.10) (1.43) (2.04) 
Lag.her education low, his education low  ref  ref 
Lag.her education high, his education high -0.086 0.286* -0.176 -0.429* 
 (-0.46) (1.76) (-0.73) (-2.01) 
Lag.her education high, his education low -0.078 0.248 -0.274 -0.338 
 (-0.41) (1.41) (-1.08) (-1.42) 
Lag.her education low, his education high -0.151 0.096 0.057 -0.106 
 (-0.65) (0.43) (0.22) (-0.43) 
Lag.age -0.043 -0.069 -0.209** -0.175** 
 (-0.79) (-1.31) (-3.02) (-2.56) 
Lag.age^2 0.000 0.000 0.002* 0.001* 
 (0.28) (0.70) (2.21) (1.66) 
Lag.health (higher score, poorer health) 0.069 0.218** 0.329** 0.265** 
 (0.75) (2.58) (2.80) (2.36) 
Lag.values (higher score, more egalitarian) -0.155 -0.195* 0.104 -0.047 
 (-1.45) (-1.91) (0.77) (-0.37) 
Lag.commitment (higher score, more 
committed) 
-0.253** -0.167* -0.342** -0.312** 
 (-2.46) (-1.69) (-2.60) (-2.47) 
Lag.Married 0.000 ref 0.000 ref 
Lag.Premarital cohabitation -0.269* -0.339* 0.262 0.263 
 (-1.73) (-2.24) (1.06) (1.09) 
Lag.Cohabiting 0.342* 0.365* 1.398*** 1.414*** 
 (1.89) (2.02) (5.23) (5.40) 
No change in number of children 0.000 ref 0.000 ref 
‘Having’ a child -0.421* -0.472** -1.102*** -1.022*** 
 (-2.11) (-2.37) (-3.40) (-3.19) 
‘Losing’ a child -0.099 0.016 4.101*** 4.017*** 
 (-0.19) (0.03) (17.15) (17.15) 
Transition to difficult to ‘Make ends meet’ 0.284 0.227 0.401 0.267 
 (1.53) (1.24) (1.50) (1.01) 
Georgia ref  ref  
Bulgaria 0.692*  2.153**  
 (0.313)  (0.662)  
Russia 1.918***  2.070**  
 (0.275)  (0.650)  
Germany 1.143*  1.876*  
 (0.442)  (0.756)  
France 0.984**  2.316***  
 (0.326)  (0.659)  
Austria 0.943**  3.293***  
 (0.323)  (0.643)  
40 
 
Lithuania 1.006**  2.365**  
 (0.368)  (0.715)  
Czech Republic 2.319***  1.500  
 (0.527)  (1.325)  
Low discrepancy  ref  ref 
Average discrepancy  1.145***  2.921*** 
  (0.152)  (0.363) 
High discrepancy   1.471***  2.222*** 
  (0.312)  (0.130) 
_cons -1.396 -1.821 -2.229 -2.280 
 (-1.18) (-1.55) (-1.39) (-1.44) 
N 5665 5665 5665 5665 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, one-tailed tested; 
a Macro-level variables tested at clustered country level with 8 macro-level units (countries) 
 
 
 
 
